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Abstract
The paper shows how the Bohmian approach to quantum physics
can be applied to develop a clear and coherent ontology of non-pertur-
bative quantum gravity. We suggest retaining discrete objects as the
primitive ontology also when it comes to a quantum theory of space-
time and therefore focus on loop quantum gravity. We conceive atoms
of space, represented in terms of nodes linked by edges in a graph, as
the primitive ontology of the theory and show how a non-local law in
which a universal and stationary wave-function figures can provide an
order of configurations of such atoms of space such that the classical
space-time of general relativity is approximated. Although there is as
yet no fully worked out physical theory of quantum gravity, we regard
the Bohmian approach as setting up a standard that proposals for a
serious ontology in this field should meet and as opening up a route
for fruitful physical and mathematical investigations.
Keywords:Bohmian mechanics, loop quantum gravity, emergence of
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1 The motivation for Bohmian mechanics
Basing itself on the ontology that Bohmian mechanics provides for quantum
mechanics, this paper seeks to set out a proposal for a Bohmian approach
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to quantum gravity. We focus on loop quantum gravity, since our intention
is to try out a primitive ontology of discrete beables also when it comes to
a quantum theory of space-time. We start with recalling the motivation for
Bohmian mechanics and its central features (this section), then sketch out
how a Bohmian theory of loop quantum gravity can look like (section 2) and
finally put this theory into the larger framework of a Bohmian approach to
physics in general (section 3). Although there is as yet no fully worked out
physical theory of quantum gravity, we consider the Bohmian approach as
setting up a standard that any proposal for a serious ontology in this field
should meet. That standard consists notably in (a) implementing a distinc-
tion between what are supposed to be elements of physical reality and what
is their mathematical representation, so that the ontological commitments of
the theory become clear, and (b) establishing a link between the ontological
commitments of the theory and observable phenomena - in this case, a clas-
sical space-time.
Bohmian mechanics (BM) is a primitive ontology approach to quantum me-
chanics (QM) (see Allori et al., 2008; Goldstein, 1998, on the notion of a
primitive ontology): an ontology of matter distributed in three-dimensional
space is admitted as the referent of the textbook formalism of QM, and a
law for the temporal development of the distribution of matter is formulated.
The motivation for doing so is to obtain an ontology that can account for
the existence of measurement outcomes - and, in general, the existence of the
macroscopic objects with which we are familiar before doing science.
BM puts forward an ontology of point-like particles that are localized in
three-dimensional space. The quantum mechanical wave-function does not
contain the information about the position of the particles, that is, the infor-
mation about the actual particle configuration. The job of the wave-function
and its temporal development according to the Schrödinger equation is to fix
the velocity of the particles given their position. The law of BM hence is the
Schrödinger equation for the temporal development of the wave-function and
an equation, known as the guiding equation, that applies the wave-function
to particle positions as initial conditions in order to obtain a velocity field
for the particles:
i~
@	t
@t
= H^	t; (1)
dQ
dt
= v	t(Q): (2)
In (2), Q denotes the spatial configuration of N particles in three-dimensional
space and 	t the wave-function of that configuration at time t. More pre-
cisely, Q stands for the configuration of all the particles at time t, and 	t is
the universal wave-function. BM thus has a straightforward application to
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the universe as a whole.
This theory goes back to a suggestion by Louis de Broglie (1928). It was
later worked out by David Bohm (1952) and cast in an elegant manner by
John Bell (see in particular Bell, 1987, ch. 17). In the following, we rely on
its contemporary version as set out in Dürr et al. (2013). If one assumes that
the initial particle configuration of the actual world is a typical configura-
tion in a precise mathematical sense, one can derive the quantum mechanical
probability calculus for measurement outcomes (Born’s rule) from BM (see
Dürr et al., 2013, ch. 2).
The ontology of BM thus is the same as the ontology of classical mechan-
ics: particles moving on definite trajectories in three-dimensional space. By
contrast to classical mechanics, however, BM is a first order theory: given
the position of the particles, the law fixes their velocity. The quantum me-
chanical features of the world are taken into account by applying to this
ontology of classical objects a non-local law: the guiding equation (2) makes
the velocity of any particle depending on, strictly speaking, the positions of
all the other particles. This is the reply that BM gives to the question of
what the ontological significance of the entanglement of the wave-function
in configuration space is. But there are no superpositions of values of prop-
erties in the world. The only property that the particles have is position.
Since they always have a definite position, they also have always a definite
value of the temporal derivative of position, that is, velocity. Given that any
measurement outcome consists in something having a certain position at a
certain time (such as, e.g., a pointer pointing either upwards or downwards),
BM reproduces on this basis - plus the above mentioned typicality assump-
tion about the initial particle configuration - the predictions of textbook QM
for measurement outcomes. In a nutshell, BM grounds the predictions of
textbook QM in an ontology of classical particles and a non-classical law.
Since the motivation for BM is to solve the notorious measurement problem
by recognizing measurement outcomes - and, in general, localized macro-
scopic objects - without changing the formalism of textbook QM (the Schrö-
dinger equation and the Born rule), the ontological commitment of the theory
is in the first place the one to particles being localized in three-dimensional
space. It contradicts that motivation to conceive BM as being committed
in the first place to the existence of a universal wave-function in a high-
dimensional space (Albert, 1996) or to regard it as a theory that is commit-
ted to the existence of the wave-function and that poses particles in addition
to the wave-function, thus provoking the objection that the postulate of the
latter is redundant (see Brown and Wallace, 2005, for that objection, and
Callender, 2009, for a Bohmian reply to it).
The wave-function cannot be a physical entity existing in three-dimensional
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space in addition to the particles, pushing them to move on certain trajecto-
ries. If it is a field, it is a field on configuration space by contrast to a field
in physical space. However, a causal connection between the mathemati-
cal space on which the wave-function is defined (i.e. configuration space)
and physical space, with an entity belonging to the former space influencing
the motion of entities existing in the latter space, would be mysterious. As
mentioned above, the role of the wave-function is to fix the velocity of the
particles given their position. That is to say, its function is that of a law
that yields a temporal development of something given initial conditions,
the initial conditions consisting here in a configuration of particles in three-
dimensional space (see Dürr et al., 2013, ch. 12).
Hence, whether and in what sense the wave-function has an ontological signif-
icance in BM depends on which metaphysical stance one adopts with respect
to laws. Thus, for instance, on Humeanism applied to BM, the Bohmian law
(2) with the universal wave-function figuring in it merely is the description
of the distribution of the particle positions in the whole of space-time (the
Humean mosaic) that achieves the best balance between simplicity and em-
pirical content (see Miller, 2013, as well as Callender, 2009, section 5, and
Esfeld et al., 2013, section 3). On dispositionalism applied to BM, the univer-
sal wave-function refers to or represents a holistic and dispositional property
of the configuration of all the particles in the universe at any time t that
fixes the temporal development of the configuration, manifesting itself in the
velocity of each particle at t (see Belot, 2012, pp. 77-80, and Esfeld et al.,
2013, sections 4-5). On primitivism about laws, over and above an initial
configuration of particles, there is a fact in each possible world that a certain
law holds in this world, with a certain universal wave-function figuring in
that law (see notably Maudlin, 2007 for primitivism about laws).
None of these stances is committed to admitting the universal wave-function
in configuration space as belonging to the ontology of BM. Even on primi-
tivism, what determines the trajectories of the particles is not the law qua
abstract entity (if abstract entities exist at all), but the law qua instantiated
in a world. However, on dispositionalism and on primitivism, by contrast to
Humeanism, the universal wave-function has an ontological significance: it
refers to or represents something that exists in the universe (a dispositional
property, a fact) over and above the particle positions.
BM thus sets up a standard for a serious ontology of physics by provid-
ing, in the case of QM, a primitive ontology of matter distributed in three-
dimensional space and a law for the temporal development of the primitive
ontology. That standard concerns not only QM, but carries on to quantum
field theory (QFT) and quantum gravity (QG). There is nothing in these
latter theories given the current state of the art that allows to solve or to
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dispel the notorious measurement problem of QM - that is, the problem of
how QM can account for measurement outcomes and in general the classical
features of the world with which we are familiar (see, e.g., Barrett, 2002, as
regards QFT). To mention just one example in order to illustrate why such a
standard is needed, consider what one of the most distinguished researchers
in non-perturbative QG says about the ontology of this theory:
A weave [...] is one of many quantum states that have a certain
macroscopic property, and a very peculiar one, since it is a single
element of the spin network basis. There is no reason for the
physical state of space not to be in a generic state, and the generic
quantum state that has this macroscopic property is not a weave
state: it is a quantum superposition of weave states. Therefore
it is reasonable to expect that at small scale, space is a quantum
superposition of weave states.
Therefore the picture of physical space suggested by LQG [loop
quantum gravity] is not truly that of a small scale lattice, or as
a T-shirt. Rather, it is a quantum probabilistic cloud of lattices.
(Rovelli, 2004, p. 271)
Whatever the world may be, it certainly cannot be a probabilistic cloud of
lattices. In the first place, probabilities always are probabilities for some-
thing, there cannot be probabilities simpliciter in the world; when it comes
to cosmological models of QG, there obviously is no question of probabilities
for observations made by an observer that stands outside the system, since
the system in this case is the whole universe. Moreover, a lattice is a means of
representation; the question hence is what in the world the lattices employed
in loop QG represent or refer to. In brief, ignoring the mentioned standard
when it comes to the ontology of QG leads to proposals of which it is difficult
to see what sense they could make. Let us therefore investigate whether and
how a Bohmian approach can set up a standard for serious ontology also in
the domain of QG.
2 Bohmian loop quantum gravity
There are some sketches of Bohmian approaches to quantum gravity and
quantum cosmology in the literature (e.g. Kowalski Glikman and Vink, 1990;
Squires, 1992; Holland, 1993; Callender and Weingard, 1994, 1996; Kowal-
ski Glikman, 1995; Shtanov, 1996; Valentini, 1996). The most elaborate of
these approaches from a foundational point of view is the one of Goldstein
and Teufel (2001) (reprinted in Dürr et al., 2013, ch. 11). These authors
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exploit the ADM formulation of Hamiltonian general relativity theory, which
consists in casting the dynamics of general relativity (GR) in terms of the
evolution of a 3-manifold (throughout the text this term will be considered
synonymous with “3-surface”) in coordinate time  . This is done by foliating
general relativistic space-time by means of space-like Cauchy 3-surfaces and
by providing the Hamiltonian equations of motion for the canonical vari-
ables which, in this case, are the Riemannian 3-metrics h defined on each
3-surface together with the conjugate momenta depending on their extrinsic
curvature. By quantizing the theory in this form - according to a proce-
dure put forward first by Dirac (1964) -, the dynamics results encoded in
a set of constraints over the physically allowed quantum gravitational wave-
functions. Leaving aside the so-called diffeomorphism constraints, which just
select all wave-functions 	(h) that are invariant under smooth surface defor-
mations (3-diffeomorphisms), the relevant dynamics for a canonical theory
of quantum gravity is given by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation:
H^	(h) = 0; (3)
where H^ is the Hamiltonian operator defined in the physical Hilbert space
of the theory.
In order to cast this theory in a Bohmian framework, Goldstein and Teufel
choose the components hab of a 3-metric as the primitive ontology, thus fix-
ing the configuration space of their Bohmian theory of QG to be the space
Riem() of Riemannian 3-metrics on a 3-manifold . They then propose
the following guiding equation for the primitive ontology:
dhab
d
= N()GabcdIm
"
	(h) 1
	(h)
hcd
#
; (4)
where Im[: : : ] represents the imaginary part of the formula in parentheses,
Gabcd is the “metric” defined over Riem(), and N() is the lapse function
which, roughly speaking, encodes information on how to “pile up” the differ-
ent h() to obtain a general relativistic 4-metric.
There are at least four important points in Goldstein’s and Teufel’s proposal
that we would like to highlight. The first one is that this theory is back-
ground independent in a general relativistic sense: it is not formulated on a
background space-time. Instead, it treats the metrical-gravitational degrees
of freedom as dynamical features. Secondly, although the Wheeler-DeWitt
equation (3) is timeless in the sense that it does not depend on any time
parameter - be it physical or just mathematical -, the guiding equation (4)
generates a non-trivial dynamics for the primitive ontology. The third point
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is that, contrary to common expectations, in this quantum theory of gravity,
there is nothing discrete about space or space-time: the primitive ontology is
given by (components of) continuous 3-metrics, and the space-time obtained
from the dynamical evolution equation (4) is continuous at all scales. Finally,
the procedure of gluing of 3-surfaces encoded in (4) depends on the speci-
fication of a lapse function N(). This means that (4) in principle selects
a privileged foliation of space-time and, hence, fixes a distinguished decom-
position of the 4-geometry into an assembly of 3-geometries. Consequently,
this Bohmian theory of QG is committed to more space-time structure than
admitted in GR for which, simply speaking, the only physically relevant ge-
ometrical structure is the 4-geometry of space-time. One possibility to avoid
this consequence would be to show that, in some way, the theory deals just
with wave-functions that generate, through (4), a dynamics which does not
depend on N(); however, it is difficult to see how this idea could be imple-
mented.
In contrast to the approach that Goldstein and Teufel take, we think that
there is a good (Bohmian) motivation to retain the commitment to a primi-
tive ontology of discrete objects also when it comes to quantum gravity. In
putting forward an ontology of particles for QM, BM subscribes to a primi-
tive ontology of discrete objects. In the same vein, when moving from QM to
QFT, in what is known as Bell-type Bohmian QFT, the primitive ontology
of particles - and thus discrete entities - is maintained so that a theory is
set out in which the empirical predictions of textbook QFT are grounded in
an ontology of particles (see Bell, 1987, ch. 19, and Dürr et al., 2013, ch.
9-10; see furthermore Struyve, 2011, for an overview of the state of the art
in Bohmian QFT). Hence, when passing from QFT to QG in a Bohmian
spirit, there is a prima facie good motivation to try out a primitive ontol-
ogy of discrete objects also when it comes to QG. However, there obviously
is no longer a question of an ontology of particles moving in a background
space in QG. If the quantum regime is applied to space-time itself and if the
framework of a primitive ontology of discrete objects is carried on from BM
and Bell-type Bohmian QFT to QG, this means that one has to develop a
primitive ontology of discrete objects for space-time itself. Such a commit-
ment can be boosted by several arguments from physics - as, for example,
the argument for the finiteness of black hole entropy (see, e.g., Sorkin, 2005,
thesis 2) - suggesting that there is some kind of discrete structure underlying
general relativistic space-time. In any case, given that the situation in QG is
currently open, we take it to be worthwhile to consider a primitive ontology
of discrete entities also in the domain of QG.
Of course, in a Bohmian context, the motivation for committing oneself to
a primitive ontology of discrete objects cannot derive from operators and
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discrete spectra of eigenvalues of operators. The Bohmians emphasize with
good reason that one cannot go from operators to ontology, but that ontology
has to come first and that the deduction of empirical predictions by means
of introducing operators or observables has to be done on the basis of the
ontology (see notably Daumer et al., 1996). The motivation for a primitive
ontology of discrete objects thus has rather to be situated in the context of
the venerable tradition of atomism in Western thought and its tremendous
success in classical physics, as well as chemistry and molecular biology.
When trying out a primitive ontology of discrete objects for QG, it is reason-
able to focus on loop quantum gravity (LQG), for this approach is committed
to the view that space-time is discrete at the fundamental level. It usually
subscribes to this commitment for reasons that the Bohmians reject, namely
the discrete spectra of the volume and area operators defined on the Hilbert
space of gravitational states. However, this fact does not rule out the possi-
bility to develop a clear ontology for LQG in Bohmian terms. Moreover, it is
of a genuine interest of its own right to explore a Bohmian approach to LQG,
since LQG is the best candidate for a theory of non-perturbative QG given
the current state of the art. Indeed, there are good reasons to expect that a
full theoretical development of LQG will deliver a genuine general relativistic
quantum theory; this expectation is strengthened by the recent results that
indicate that the formalism of LQG is derivable from GR both through a
straightforward canonical quantization and via a covariant quantization on a
lattice (historically, one of the first works highlighting the compatibility be-
tween a canonical and a covariant dynamics for LQG is that of Reisenberger
and Rovelli, 1997). Nonetheless, many details have still to be filled in - the
full specification of a physical Hilbert space of the theory, in the first place
-, and a lot of technical difficulties have to be addressed (see Rovelli, 2004,
for the standard textbook in LQG).
Given these open physical issues and given the fact that no work at all has
been done as yet on a Bohmian approach to LQG, we have to limit ourselves
in this section to sketching out how the central features of the Bohmian ap-
proach can be applied to LQG - that is, a primitive ontology and a law for
the primitive ontology. In what follows, we will restrict ourselves to the case
of pure gravity; that is to say, we will not take matter into consideration.
Since LQG is intended to be a straightforward quantum theoretical version
of GR, it is a background independent theory (see Smolin, 2006, for an ar-
gument why a theory of QG should be background independent, and see
Belot, 2011; Rickles, 2008, for a philosophical discussion of background inde-
pendence). The - at the present stage just kinematical but, hopefully, also
physical - Hilbert space of quantum gravitational states of LQG admits a
countable basis formed by states called spin networks. By specifying an em-
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bedding in a 3-manifold, a given spin network gains a spatial representation
in terms of a nodes/edges-structure, namely, a graph. Each node and edge
in a graph is labelled or “colored” by a representation of the SU(2) group,
hence spin network. The important point is that it does not matter how
a spin network is embedded in a 3-manifold. This means that the physical
information encoded in the corresponding labelled graph is not affected by
arbitrary smooth deformations of the 3-manifold. In short, we will refer to
spin networks as equivalence classes of graphs under 3-diffeomorphisms.
The most common interpretation of spin networks is the geometric one which
exploits the fact that the labeling of nodes and edges in a graph represents
contributions to eigenvalues, respectively, of volume and area operators de-
fined on the Hilbert space of gravitational states (see Rovelli and Smolin,
1995, and Rovelli, 2004, pp. 269-270, who make clear that this is not an ini-
tial assumption, but a consequence of the theory). LQG thus is committed
to fundamental discrete structures underlying a classical smooth 3-geometry
(this justifies the talk of “weave states” often found in the literature). This
commitment suggests that the complete theory has to describe the spatial
geometry as being made up of discrete (perhaps Planck-sized) extensions of
space that are small enough to be “smoothed out” when looked at from a
large-scale perspective. Even though this geometrical interpretation of grav-
itational states in LQG is not the only possible one (see e.g. Thiemann,
2007, section 11.1, for some alternative accounts), it is the one that admits
the most straightforward ontological reading.
Hence, in a Bohmian version of this theory - let us call it Bohmian loop
quantum gravity or BLQG -, the objects that are introduced as the primi-
tive ontology of the theory have to meet three requirements: (1) they cannot
be local beables in the standard sense, that is, objects localized in space-time,
such as unextended particles occupying a position (see Bell, 1987, ch. 7, for
the notion of local beables). (2) They have to be discrete. (3) They have
to approximate a smooth 3-geometry when grouped together in a suitable
way. In other words, it has to be possible to derive a smooth 3-geometry by
suitably coarse-graining a configuration of such objects.
Therefore, if we want to retain a commitment to Bohmian “particles” - i.e.
discrete fundamental beables - in a background independent context, we need
to switch to a view of particles as partless objects, that is, mereological atoms.
In this way, we give up a characterization of these objects in terms of a po-
sition in space while retaining their discreteness and their fundamentality.
If we consider a 3-space as a mereological whole, then the commitment to
atomism implies that this whole cannot be divided in smaller and smaller
regions ad libitum. Instead, the process of division comes to an end when a
mereological atom is reached. Let us therefore pose elementary extensions of
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space - atoms of space so to speak - as the primitive ontology of BLQG. These
atoms are not localized in space. They rather are localizations of space. In
this manner, we seek to extend the classical notion of local beables to the
quantum-gravitational regime.
Let us now turn to configurations of these fundamental objects. In order to
obtain a configuration, we have to introduce a certain fundamental relation
in which atoms of space have to stand. Since we seek to recover the metrical-
gravitational field from configurations of atoms of space, this relation should
not be a metrical one from the outset; it should be prior to any metrical
characterization. Let us therefore consider a set X of N atoms of space and
let us introduce a contiguity relation1 C  X  X such that it is:
- Irreflexive: 8x 2 X:C(x; x).
- Symmetric: 8x; y 2 X (C(x; y)  C(y; x)).
- Serial : 8x 2 X9y 2 XC(x; y).
From the ordered couple (X ; C) a topological space X can be constructed
such that its points are the elements of X , and each subset fx; yg  X for
which C(x; y) holds is identified with the unit interval [0; 1]. If we let two
elements in E = ffx; yg  X jC(x; y)g be “glued” together if and only if they
have (at least) one point in common, then the topology defined over X turns
out to be the graph topology, which means that X can be pictorially repre-
sented as a finite graph  X = (X ; E) with X the set of nodes, and E the set
of edges. The coloring of the graph is then mathematically represented by
a suitably defined function that assigns a label (e.g. a representation of the
SU(2) group) to each element of the graph.
We can then define in X an approximation function kN to a “target” smooth
3-manifold M as a funtion kN : X  ! M depending on the number N of
atoms of space such that, in the “continuum” limit N  ! 1 it becomes a
homeomorphism (this is just a heuristic sketch: see Sorkin, 1991, especially
sections 2 and 4, for a mathematically rigorous articulation of this approxi-
mation procedure). By the same token, all the large-scale metrical quantities
should be recoverable as results of the same limiting procedure on appropri-
ately defined approximation functions (which, in general, would depend also
on the coloring of a graph). Of course, implementing such an approximation
is in general a highly non-trivial task (for example, for some X, it might
be impossible to define continuum approximation functions), but it is not a
desperate one. Moreover, fulfilling this task can be easily given a concrete
1Perhaps, it would be better to call it “companionship” relation, since the word “conti-
guity” might mistakenly suggest that such a relation bears some spatial connotation.
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Figure 1: An extremely simple 2-dimensional nodes/edges-structure repre-
senting a “bubbly” space. The physical characterization of each bubble is
encoded in the coloring of the correspondent node, while the information
about “how much” two bubbles touch each other is conveyed by the coloring
of the edges (in general, there can be more than one) linking them. Of course,
in three dimensions, graphs do not have be planar.
physical meaning. Simply speaking, in fact, for a sufficiently large number
of atoms of space, the small-scale picture of BLQG is that of a cluster of
“bubbles” touching each other. Such a picture can be compactly expressed
in terms of a graph where a node represents a bubble (its color representing
its “size”) and the colored edges connecting two nodes represent “how much”
the corresponding bubbles touch each other (see figure 1).
Not surprisingly, this procedure closely resembles the introduction of a weave
state in LQG, but an important point has to be clarified in this respect. In
fact, LQG conflates under the designation “weave state” two quite distinct
concepts, namely, (a) the properly intended quantum state jXi (belonging
to the Hilbert space) and (b) its pictorial representation  X (belonging to
the configuration space of graphs), but it only accords full physical dignity
to the former. The Bohmian reading, instead, turns the tables by regarding
 X as standing for a concrete configuration of concrete entities which are the
physical referents of the formalism.
Moreover, in standard LQG, a generic quantum gravitational state is consid-
ered to be a superposition of weave states, thus giving rise to the ontological
confusion expressed in the quotation from Rovelli in the previous section.
11
The Bohmian approach provides ontological clarity for LQG by maintaining
that there are no superposed states of anything existing in nature. Superpo-
sitions enter into the calculation of probabilities for measurement outcomes,
but they do not belong to the ontology of the theory. The central ontological
claim of BLQG is that there is exactly one configuration of atoms of space.
Consequently, BLQG does not face a principled problem in recovering the
classical space-time of GR from configurations of atoms of space, since the
ontology of the theory is classical from the outset, although space is discrete
at the fundamental level according to this theory. By contrast, if one ad-
mits superpositions of such configurations as the ontology of LQG, then it
is entirely mysterious how such superpositions could disappear in order to
give rise to the classical space-time of GR. This is, of course, the way in
which the notorious measurement problem of QM strikes LQG, if one does
not take care to start with a primitive ontology of the theory. Furthermore,
as we have seen, BLQG provides the possibility for giving a clear physical
sense to the claim that a universal configuration of atoms of space “weaves
up” a large scale smooth 3-geometry, and, in the same manner, it provides
a (yet-to-be implemented) conceptually straightforward mechanism for the
appearance of physical metrical quantities at large scales resulting from an
underlying non-metrical regime.
However, the claim that atoms of space bear no metrical properties while
extended space does so may sound odd. But consider the following analogy:
it is perfectly possible for a lump of matter to instantiate a certain property,
say having a particular shape, while the material atoms (the particles) that
compose it do not have a shape; grouping these material atoms together in a
suitable manner makes it that the resulting object (the lump) has a certain
shape. The same reasoning applies to atoms of space and the regions they
form: grouping the atoms of space together in a suitable manner as repre-
sented by nodes and edges on a graph makes it possible for the configuration
to instantiate metrical properties, while the individual atoms of space are
connected only by a contiguity relation.
Having obtained a clear ontological characterization of the universal config-
uration X in BLQG, we can now turn to supplying a guiding equation for
its dynamics. Before doing so, let us recall that, since LQG is derived from
a canonical quantization of GR, its dynamics is constrained by the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation, which, in the present context, reads as follows:
H^	  = 0: (5)
The subscript   of the (universal) wave-function means that it is defined over
the configuration space of graphs. With this clarification in place, we can
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introduce the following - tentative - guiding equation for BLQG:
_X / F

	 ;D	 ; X

; (6)
The _X represents the evolution of a configuration of atoms of space X with
respect to a coordinate time  - that is, a mathematical index that labels
configurations - and F is a function of X, of the wave-function and of D	 ,
that is, a suitably defined first-order derivative of such a wave-function. As
a Bohmian law, (6) should show the same mathematical form of (2) and (4),
namely:
_X / j
	 
	 
: (7)
This means that in BLQG, as in any other Bohmian theory, the dynam-
ical development of a configuration of atoms X is related through a suit-
ably defined coupling constant to the ratio between the probability current
j	  = Im[	 D	 ] and the probability density 	  = 	 	  = j	 j2. How-
ever, at the present stage, the theoretical developments of both LQG and
BLQG make it difficult to be more explicit about (6) because we do not have
at hand a clear mathematical characterization of quantum-gravitational wave
functions and, most importantly, of the configuration space S  of the theory.
For example, we do not have any clue of what topology S  should have: if
this space turns out to be discrete, then “topology” might not even be the
right word. Moreover, if S  is discrete, then (6) and (7) might have to be
replaced by stochastic equations or, perhaps, the dynamical evolution should
be considered as taking place in discrete steps, that is,  could be a discrete
parameter. This lack of implementation, then, prevents us from accomplish-
ing the mathematical task of constructing probability densities and currents
for BLQG, and hence specify (6). Nonetheless, we can already sketch out
how the dynamics of such a theory should work.
First of all, as in the case of QM, the dynamics of BLQG shifts the physical
accent from the Hilbert space of universal gravitational states to the space of
universal configurations of the elementary objects of the theory - in this case,
atoms of space arranged through a contiguity relation, instead of particles
occupying a position in a background space. Secondly, in this context, the
universal wave-function retains, mutatis mutandis, the twofold meaning of
the quantum mechanical one. More precisely, if 	  is a solution of (5), j	 j2
provides a probability distribution over all the actualisable configurations of
atoms of space at a certain dynamical stage  - contrary to the odd standard
interpretation which takes it to be the probability distribution of outcomes
for an experiment performed on the entire universe “from the outside”. Such
a probability distribution does not depend on coordinate time, so it is the
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same for all  ’s. On the other hand, F singles out a unique path in the
configuration space corresponding to the dynamical evolution described by
(6). This latter equation is a non-local law exactly as (2) because all the
space atoms in a configuration are entangled together by the wave-function.
Before clarifying what non-locality means in the present context, let us spell
out in more detail what equation (6) is supposed to do. Simply speaking,
the guiding equation should encode a set of simple rules that can be illus-
trated in terms of “local moves” on graphs (expansions or contractions by
means of additions or subtractions of nodes and edges). By applying and
reiterating such moves on a “starting” graph, we generate a structure made
up by a “pile” of graphs and, at the same time, we “propagate” the coloring of
the starting graph throughout the structure. Such a structure does not only
display labelled nodes and edges, but also “faces” which encode information
on how the contiguity relation changes from one graph to the subsequent one
(see figure 2).
Figure 2: Particular of a spinfoam. The dynamics expands the lower node to
three contiguous nodes when moving to the subsequent upper configuration.
As a result, the upper and the lower parts of the configuration are linked by
three “faces”. Such a structure is commonly called a vertex of the spinfoam.
In the standard theory, such a structure is called “spinfoam”, and the covari-
ant dynamics of LQG is in fact a sum-over-spinfoams in the following sense.
Given an initial configuration state jXii and a final one jXfi, the theory
considers all the possible spinfoams, that is, all dynamically possible paths
connecting the initial and the final configuration, assigns a probability am-
plitude to each path, and then calculates the total state transition amplitude
Wif as a sum over all possible paths (see e.g. Rovelli, 2004, section 9.1).
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In contrast to the above mentioned dynamical descriptions, in BLQG the
dynamics encoded in (6) describes exactly one actual path in configuration
space leading from the initial to the final configuration, which is fully deter-
mined once the initial configuration is plugged into equation (6). Provided
that (5) and (6) are really compatible, BLQG then grounds the probability
amplitudes of the standard theory by taking them to express our ignorance of
the final state in the configuration space given our ignorance of the initial con-
figuration of atoms of space. In other words, BLQG adds to standard LQG
a parameter - namely that there always is exactly one actual and uniquely
labelled configuration of atoms of space X - and provides a guiding equation
for this actual configuration. In this manner, exactly one evolution path in
the configuration space is singled out, and the dynamics of the theory ac-
quires a clear ontological significance, namely to describe the actual evolution
of the initial configuration of atoms of space.
In fact, the dynamics as given by (6) deals with configurations as a whole
and, hence, without specifying the entire initial configuration, we cannot
predict with certainty how a proper part of such configuration will evolve,
because the dynamics of BLQG is non-local. As in BM, so also in BLQG,
the dynamical evolution of any proper part of a configuration depends on
all the other parts. To be more precise, in BM the non-locality resides in
the fact that, at each instant, the velocity of a given particle assigned by
(2) depends, strictly speaking, on the positions of all the other particles,
however far apart in space they may be. Of course, in BLQG, (6) does not
assign velocities to the atoms of space in a configuration and is not concerned
with “trajectories” of atoms of space - or, indeed, an identity of individual
atoms from one configuration to the next one - but, rather, assigns to each
atom a move such that a transition from one configuration to the next one is
achieved. In this context, to say that the dynamics is non-local means that,
for each configuration, the move assigned to a given atom depends on the
way in which all the atoms are arranged, even those not contiguous with the
atom considered.
Moreover, given that (6) provides a dynamics for the primitive ontology,
BLQG has the means to describe a physical process that involves change,
namely, change in the instantiation patterns of the contiguity relation from
one configuration to the subsequent one, as encoded in the change of labeling
between configurations. In other words, since BLQG postulates two laws -
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (5) and the guiding equation (6) -, the fact
that the wave-function figuring in (5) is stationary does not create a problem
for BLQG to take change into account. Hence, BLQG is in the position to
restore a familiar dynamical picture in which the classical space-time of GR
is approximated by a stack of universal configurations fXig whose ordering is
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given by (6). The above mentioned evolution can be conceived as a series of
configurations (the Xi’s) that are “interlaced” by means of faces according to
the guiding equation (6) in order to form a classical space-time. The specific
configurations that are involved in this dynamical process are “selected” by
	  according to (5): The microscopic dynamics is linked to the macroscopic
classical one by the fact that, once we apply the dynamical law to a configu-
ration which is typical for a wave-function compatible with (5), we generate
an evolution that, at large scale, resembles the 3+1 evolution of Hamiltonian
GR. This means that each configuration approximates a smooth 3-manifold
and (6) “piles up” such “quasi” 3-manifolds, thus approximating a foliation
of a 4-manifold.
If this view proves sound, then it will be possible to recover a classical picture
of a globally hyperbolic space-time which admits a (in general, non-unique)
global time function (as, for example, in the Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-
Walker model of GR). In such a case, there would be a clear sense in which,
at a classical level, a weak temporal ordering supervenes on the fundamental
ordering established by (6): in this respect, BLQG is some sort of “dis-
crete cousin” of Goldstein’s and Teufel’s BQG. It is important to note that,
although the above dynamical picture is far from being physically imple-
mented, it points to a conceptually clear direction that physicists can follow
in seeking a concrete physical mechanism for the appearance of general rel-
ativistic space-time from the underlying quantum gravitational regime.
The sketch of BLQG that we have drawn in this section comes with a se-
ries of provisos, which can be summarized in the following conditional: if a
definite theory of LQG shows the features we have mentioned (in particular
the “geometrical weaves” interpretation on which much of our reasoning was
based) and if it is possible to implement a guiding equation (6) - be it deter-
ministic (as we have tacitly assumed so far) or stochastic - that is compatible
with the dynamics of standard LQG, then the account of configurations of
atoms of space developed in this section provides a primitive ontology for
this theory. Of course, it might turn out that LQG will develop in a totally
different way or that, eventually, it will prove itself to be a theoretical dead
end. While we have to wait for the further theoretical development of LQG,
we nonetheless claim already at this stage that we have shown a way how to
formulate a clear ontology of this theory, avoiding the confusions that are un-
fortunately widespread even in the best physical literature (cf. the quotation
from Rovelli at the end of the previous section).
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3 Bohmian quantum gravity within the Bohmian
approach to physics
As the presentation in the preceding section makes clear, the structure of
a Bohmian ontology for QG is the same as in the case of QM: one poses a
primitive ontology, consisting in an initial configuration of beables, and a law
for the transition from one such configuration to another one. The primitive
ontology is classical in the sense that it simply exists - there are no super-
positions of possible configurations of beables, just one actual configuration.
What distinguishes the ontology of a quantum theory from the ontology of
a classical theory is situated exclusively in the law of the development of the
configuration of beables: that law is non-local in that it applies only to the
configuration as a whole. It cannot be separated into factors that provide for
a development of each element of the configuration taken individually (the
only way to do so is by means of approximation procedures like the one that
yields effective wave-functions). In a nutshell, the theory poses classical ob-
jects and a non-classical law for their development. Probabilities then enter
into the theory as in classical statistical mechanics: we need probabilities
only because of our - principled - ignorance of what the actual initial config-
uration of beables is.
When moving from QM via QFT to QG in a Bohmian approach, more stress
is laid on the configuration of the beables and on what fixes its development
than on the individual beables. In Bohmian QM, it would be wrong-headed
to conceive what is represented by the wave-function as generating the tem-
poral development of the particles. As in Newtonian mechanics, the particles
move anyway (or are at rest), and the role of what the wave-function stands
for is only to fix the form of their temporal development - in other words,
to fix what the trajectories of the particles are like, but not to generate the
fact that there are trajectories at all. In Bell’s proposal for a Bohmian QFT,
the particles (the local beables) lose ontological weight so to speak, since the
particle number no longer is an invariant (see Bell, 1987, ch. 19, and Dürr
et al., 2013, ch. 10): what fixes the temporal development of the particle con-
figuration is such that it includes stochastic events of particle creation and
annihilation. Consequently, the particles (the local beables) no longer have
an identity in time independently of what fixes the temporal development of
the configuration. In BLQG, the individual atoms of space have even less
ontological significance, a space-time is built up through the guiding equa-
tion (6) applied to universal configurations of such atoms of space. More
precisely, if we regard the universal wave-function as encoding information
about all the actualisable graphs in a possible world selected by (5) (which in
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the standard interpretation is taken to be a static quantum superposition of
gravitational states), then (6) establishes an actualization ordering of the uni-
versal configurations of such atoms of space. Consequently, there is nothing
that connects the individual atoms of space in different configurations apart
from what is supplied by what the universal and stationary wave-function
stands for.
As explained in section 1, the Bohmian approach consists in providing a
primitive ontology for a physical theory and a law for the development of
the elements of the primitive ontology. In any Bohmian quantum theory, the
wave-function is not a physical entity in addition to and on a par with the
elements of the primitive ontology, but falls on the side of the law: its job
is to fix the development of the elements of the primitive ontology, given an
initial configuration of these elements. However, this does not imply that the
wave-function does not have an ontological significance. Only if one adopts a
Humean attitude to laws, the ontology is exhausted by the primitive ontology,
the law (and whatever figures in it) being merely an economical description
of the total arrangement of the elements of the primitive ontology in a world.
By contrast, if one grounds laws in properties of the elements of the primitive
ontology, then our proposal for BLQG results in the following ontology: the
initial configuration of atoms of space instantiates a holistic and dispositional
property that manifests itself in the transition from one configuration to the
subsequent one. That property is represented by the universal wave-function,
and it grounds the law of the development of the configurations. The fact
that the universal wave-function is stationary means that the instantiation
of that holistic and dispositional property is the same for any configuration
of atoms of space in a world - in other words, that property does not change
when moving from an initial configuration to subsequent ones.
In the same vein, on primitivism about laws, over and above there being
an initial configuration of atoms of space, there is the fact instantiated in
any world of BLQG that a certain law holds in this world, with a certain
universal and stationary wave-function figuring in that law. Given the fact
that a certain law is instantiated and the initial configuration of atoms of
space, a development towards certain subsequent configurations of atoms of
space ensues. Hence, in any Bohmian quantum theory including QG, the
Bohmian framework of a primitive ontology and a law for the development
of the elements of the primitive ontology allows for these elements to instan-
tiate a property or a fact that grounds the law and that is represented by the
wave-function, although it is an inaccurate description that has led to much
confusion in the literature to present the Bohmian theory as being commit-
ted to the existence of the wave-function over and above the existence of the
primitive ontology.
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There is a well-known tension between any Bohmian quantum theory and
relativity physics (see Maudlin, 2011 for a precise examination of the tension
between quantum non-locality and relativity physics in general). In the case
of BLQG, this tension consists in the fact that, as the theory was formulated
in the previous section, the transition from an initial configuration of atoms
of space to subsequent ones such that the ordering of these configurations
through the guiding equation (6) approximates the space-time of GR singles
out a preferred foliation of space-time by means of 3-surfaces, as in the pro-
posal for BQG by Goldstein and Teufel. To illustrate this issue, consider a
top-down analysis of the dynamics of the theory. We thus have a classical
space-time as a block of atoms of space, and all these atoms can in turn be
grouped into distinct configurations piled together according to (6). BLQG
then selects a privileged form of carrying out this task. The reason is the
ontological commitment of BLQG to exactly one actual initial configuration
of atoms of space and exactly one path from an initial to a final configuration
that is selected by the guiding equation (6), which is a non-local law, always
taking one entire configuration to a subsequent entire configuration. Conse-
quently, there is a fact of the matter which of these entire configurations are
connected by the law (6) in any world of BLQG.
Thus, it may turn out that the ontological clarity of the Bohmian approach
to any quantum theory comes at the price of being committed to more geo-
metrical structure of space-time than is admitted in relativity physics - with,
however, it being possible that this additional structure is provided for by the
universal wave-function (for a suggestion in that sense, see Dürr et al., 2013).
In other words, it may be the case that the Bohmian approach is committed
to maintaining that when considered from a quantum perspective, one of the
main tenets of relativistic theories, viz. the absence of a privileged space-time
foliation, proves to be an epistemic instead of an ontic affair. This means that
we cannot have knowledge of the additional quantum-geometrical structure
involved because we cannot know the initial configuration of the elements of
the primitive ontology (the initial configuration of atoms of space in BLQG).
However, endorsing a privileged quantum foliation of space-time is compati-
ble with all the empirical results of GR. If one rejects that commitment, then
one has to do better and to show how one can formulate a clear ontology
for a quantum theory of matter and space-time that pays heed to quantum
non-locality without subscribing to a privileged foliation of space-time. In
any case, it is not an admissible attitude to refuse to enter into the business
of setting out a clear ontology for quantum physics because doing so may
bring out a tension between quantum physics and relativity physics.
Our proposal for a Bohmian theory of LQG provides a precise sense in which
space-time is emergent and in which it is not emergent (see Huggett and
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Wüthrich, 2013, for a philosophical discussion of the claim of the emergence
of space-time in QG): space-time is emergent in that it is built up from a se-
ries of configurations of atoms of space and two laws, namely, (5) that selects
all the actualizable configurations in a possible world and (6) that provides
for a dynamics of the transition from one such configuration to subsequent
ones. But space-time emerges from concrete physical entities, namely atoms
of space whose initial configuration approximates a classical 3-dimensional
space. It is thus much more precise to talk in terms of the approximation of
the space-time of GR by configurations of elements of the primitive ontology
of BLQG ordered by a certain law than to use the expression “emergence of
space-time”. There is no problem in BLQG how a quantum configuration can
lead to a classical space-time, since according to the Bohmian approach, the
objects of the theory are in any case classical in that there always is exactly
one actual configuration of the elements of the primitive ontology (instead of
superpositions) and all what is specific for a quantum theory is contained in
the law that applies to these configurations. Due to its ontological precision,
the Bohmian approach to QG does not contain any unclear - and unintelli-
gible - claims that confuse means of mathematical representation with the
ontology of a physical theory in suggesting that space-time could emerge from
non-spatial entities such as a wave-function in configuration space, algebraic
relations among operators, etc.
In conclusion, whatever the truth of the matter may be, as in the non-
relativistic case, so also in the case of QG, the Bohmian approach sets a
standard that any proposal for a serious ontology in this field should meet,
distinguishing between the ontology of a physical theory and the means of
its mathematical representation as well as providing a link from the funda-
mental ontology to classical phenomena (such as the classical space-time of
GR).
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